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哲学と哲学史を研究している人の記録

Metaphysical Nihilism関連文献

「そもそもなぜ何かが存在するのか」という問いが前提にしているようにも見える、「何もなかったかもしれない」という可能性(この可能性を認める立場は、“Metaphysical Nihilism”と呼ばれる)をめぐる最近の議論を追っかけてみようと思い、とりあえず出版年順に関連論文を並べてみた。随時追加予定。

背景

  • Lewis, D. K. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell.
  • Armstrong, D. M. 1989. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge University Press.
  • Van Inwagen, P. 1996. “Why Is There Anything at All?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70: 95-110. (翻訳「そもそもなぜ何かがあるのか」、青山・谷川・柏端編訳『現代形而上学論文集』、勁草書房、2006年。)
  • Lowe, E. J. 1996. “Why is There Anything at All?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 70: 111-120.

Baldwin 1996 (もともとはInwagenとLoweへのコメント)以降。

  • Baldwin, Th. 1996. “There might be nothing.” Analysis 56: 231-38.
  • Rodiguez-Pereyra, G. 1997. “There might be Nothing: the Subtraction Argument Improved.” Analysis 57: 159-166.
  • Carlson, E. & Olsson, E. J. 2001. “The Presumption of Nothingness.” Ratio 14: 203-221.
  • Rodiguez-Pereyra, G. 2002. “Lowe’s argument against nihilism.” Analysis 60: 335-340.
  • Lowe, E. J. 2002. “Metaphysical Nihilism and the Subtraction Argument.” Analysis 62: 62-73.
  • Paseau, A. “Why the Subtraction Argument Does Not Add Up.” Analysis 62: 73-75.
  • Rodiguez-Pereyra, G. 2002. “Metaphysical Nihilism Defended: Reply to Lowe and Paseau.” Analysis 62: 172-180.
  • Coggins, G. 2003. “World and Object: Metaphysical Nihilism and Three Accounts of Worlds.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (NS) 103: 353-360.
  • Cameron, R. P. 2003. “Much Ado about Nothing: A Study of Metaphysical Nihilism.” Erkenntnis 64: 193-222.
  • Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. 2004. “Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism.” Mind 113: 683-704.
  • Roy A Sorensen 2005. “The ethics of empty worlds.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83: 349-356.
  • Efird, D. & Stoneham, T. 2005a. “Genuine Modal Realism and Empty World.” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1: pp. 21-37.
  • Efird, D. & Stoneham, T. 2005b. “The Subtraction Argument for Metaphysical Nihilism.” The Journal of Philosophy 102: 303-325.
  • Paseau, A. 2006. “The Subtraction Argument(s).” Dialectica 60: 145–156.
  • Efird, D. & Stoneham, T. 2006. “Combinatorialism and the Possibility of Nothing.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84: 269-280.
  • Cameron, Ross P. 2007. “Subtractability and Concreteness.” The Philosophical Quarterly 57: 273-279.
  • Rorensen, R. 2009. “Nothingness.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Efird, D. & Stoneham, T. 2009a. “Justifying Metaphysical Nihilism. A Response to Cameron.” The Philosophica Quarterly 59: 132-137.
  • Efird, D. & Stoneham, T. 2009b. “Is Metaphysical Nihilism Interesting?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90: 210-231.
  • Hansen, S. B. 2010. “Metaphysical Nihilism and Cosmological Arguments: Some Tractarian Comments.” European Journal of Philosophy 18: 1-20.
  • Coggins, G. 2010. Could There Have Been Nothing? Against Metaphysical Nihilism, Palgrave Macmillan. (A Review by Kelly Trogdon in NDPR, 2011)
  • Hoffman, A. 2011. “It's not the End of the World: When the Subtraction Argument for Metaphysical Nihilism Fails.” Analysis 71: 44-53.